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This paper is about one of the least successful of South Africa's
revolutionary movements. Several thousand Poqo insurrectionists were
arrested during the course of the 1960s. The vast majority of these
were detained and convicted before they had had a chance to strike a
single blow. Fewer than thirty deaths can be attributed to the activ-
ities of Poqo adherents of whom nearly the same number were sentenced
to death in South African courts. The history of the Poqo uprisings
is a history without a climax. Its final act takes place in the
courtrooms not the barricades. Perhaps for this reason the Poqo story
has lacked a chronicler. This paper is an attempt to compensate for
the perfunctory treatment Poqo has received from historians. It
provides a narrative of Poqo's development and a description of its
social following. It then attempts to assess Poqo's historical
significance.
After the Sharpeville crisis and a confused period during which
African politicians adjusted to new conditions of illegality a variety
of insurgent organisations emerged. Of these the two most important
were those linked to the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the African
National Congress (ANC). These were both dedicated to revolutionary
transformations of society and were both prepared to employ violent
measures to attain this but there the similarity between them ended.
The PAC-oriented 'Poqo1 movement and the ANC's military wing 'Umkhonto
we Sizwe' reflected in their divergent strategies the fundamental
ideological and strategic differences which had led to the fission in
African resistance politics in the 1950s. As well as this the PAC
insurgents were very much more numerous than the Umkhonto activists.
Whilst the latter operated as an elite within the framework of a larg-
er clandestine and sometimes less committed 'support organisation'
the Poqo insurgency in certain localities attained the dimensions of a
mass movement. Reaching the peak of its influence in 1963, the Poqo
movement was still capable three years later of inspiring violent
conspiracies: in 1966 in the Eastern Cape alone, 85 men accused of
PAC activity were convicted in six trials. In terms of its geograph-
ical extensiveness, the numbers involved and its timespan, the Poqo
conspiracies of 1962-1968 represent the largest and most sustained
African insurrectionary movement since the inception of modern African
political organisations in South Africa.
The word 'Poqo1 is a Xhosa expression meaning 'alone' or 'pure1.
The earliest known usage of the word in the context of a separatist
organisation occurred when the Ethiopianist Church of South Africa was
established. Its members would describe themselves, as: 'Ndingum
Topiya Poqo' (belonging to the Church of Ethiopia). The word was
used sometimes in the Western Cape in 1960 as a slogan by PAC members
to describe the character of their organisation in contrast to the
multiracial dimension of the Congress Alliance. Leaflets allegedly
circulated by PAC activists in Port Elizabeth in May 1961 opposing the
ANC's call for a stay-away in protest against the governments' procla-
mation of a republic bore the legend: 'May demos a fraud, Poqo, Poqo,
Poqo'. The authorities and the press tended to employ the term to
describe all PAC-connected conspiracies though only PAC supporters in
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the Cape identified themselves as Poqo members at first. Here, for
the sake of simplicity, the state's usage of the term will be follow-
ed, though, as will become clear, different regional concentrations of
PAC/Poqo affinity had quite distinct social characteristics. The
first moves towards the formation of a violent organisation came in
the Western Cape and it is here that the narrative will begin.
The Western Cape, and in particular the Cape Peninsula, had been
one of the areas of strongest support for the PAC. This could be
related to the particularly fierce effects of influx control in the
Cape Peninsula, the 'repatriation' of women and children to the Trans-
kei, the refusal of the authorities to construct adequate housing and
sharply deteriorating living conditions. In addition, in the early
1960s the imposition of Bantu Authorities and land rehabilitaion
measures in the Transkei also influenced the political responses of
Africans in the Cape Peninsula and its hinterland. The Pan-Africanist
Congress's rhetorical militancy, the incorporation into its ideology
of themes drawn from traditions of primary resistance, and the
immediacy of its strategic objectives made it especially attractive to
the increasingly large migrant worker population of Cape Town. The
Pan Africanists found an important section of their following in the
'bachelor zones' of Langa. However, of the thirty-one PAC leaders
who were subsequently put on trial in Cape Town after the 1960 pass
campaign, only seven men were from the migrant workers' hostels in
Langa and Nyanga. Unfortunately, the trial documentation only contains
full details of the backgrounds of a few of the leaders: they included
a herbalist, a dry cleaning examiner, a domestic servant, a university
student, a tailor and a farmworker and their ages ranged from twenty
two to fifty five (the majority of the accused were over thirty). At
least seven were former members of the ANC and one had once belonged
to the Communist Party. The evidence suggests a not altogether
surprising social pattern: a political movement with a large follow-
ing amongst migrant workers, but with positions of responsibility held
by men with at least some education, work skills and political
experience.
During the 1960 pass campaign as well as before and after it, there
was considerable contact between the local Pan Africanist leaders and
members of the multiracial Liberal Party. This was despite frequent
attacks on white radicals who had been associated with the Congress
movement. Local Liberals were seeking a mass base and though wary
of the racialist undertones of Pan-Africanist ideology, they sympa-
thised with and were attracted by the PAC' s hostility to left wing
influences within the Congress movement. Cape Town PAC leaders,
whatever their private feelings about the Liberals, were glad to
accept offers of assistance that appeared to be without strings, and
allowed certain Liberals to play an important intermediary role
between them and the authorities during the 1960 troubles in Cape
Town. Whereas this relationship had certain advantages at the time,
it did have the effect of isolating the leaders from rank and file
membership, as well as the large informal following the campaign
generated.
In the months following the crisis of March-April 1960, this gulf
between leaders and followers was to widen and take on a factional
form. Some of the main leaders, including Philip Kgosana, jumped bail
and left the country towards the end of 1960. This considerably weak-
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state witness evidence in a trial involving a member of Tshongayi's
cell, there was an unsuccessful meeting to recruit people on a farm
near Somerset West in February 1961. More successful in this
context apparently was the establishment of a Poqo cell on a farm at
Stellenbosch in October 1961 after a visit by three Poqo men from Cape
Town. A Poqo group was active between March 1962 and April 1963 on
a farm in the Elgin District.
Poqo's message was stated in simple direct terms. In December 1961
a leaflet in Xhosa was picked up in Nyanga. It read:
We are starting again Africans ... we die once. Africa will
be free on January 1st. The white people shall suffer, the
black people will rule. Freedom comes after bloodshed. Poqo
has started. It needs a real man. The Youth has weapons so
you need not be afraid. The PAC says this.
Sometimes the message was more specific: farmworkers were told that
Poqo intended to take the land away from whites and give it to Afri-
cans. Men in Wellington were told that one day they must throw away
their passes and take over the houses of the whites. All who did not
join Poqo would be killed along 'with the white bosses'. Men in Paarl
were told there was no need for whites; the factories and the indus-
tries would carjpy on as usual, for was it not the black people who
worked in them? Chiefs should be killed, for it was they who were
responsible for the endorsement-out of Africans from the Western
Cape. Sometimes Poqo members giving evidence would repeat some of
the old PAC slogans - from Cape to Cairo, from Morocco to Madagas-
car, - but often witnesses would claim that they knew nothing of the
ANC or PAC. This may have been prompted by caution on their part,
but what is noticeable is that many of the distinctive attributes of
PAC speeches given at a popular level had disappeared: there were no
references to Pan Africanism, communism or socialism and no careful
clarifications of the movement's attitude with regard to the position
of racial minorities. Ideological statements had beeji. boiled down to
a set of slogans: 'We must stand alone in our land'; 'Freedom - to
stand alone and not be suppressed by whites'; ' amaAf rica Poqo;
'Izwe Lethu1 (our land).
Poqo's lack of a 'political theory1, the brutal simplicity of its
catchphrases, the absence of any social programme save for the des-
truction of the present order and its replacement with its inversion
in which white would be black, and black would be white, all this has
helped to diminish its importance in the historiography of South Afri-
can resistance movements. But because the slogans were simple does
not mean that they were banal: they evoked a profound response from
men who had been forced off the land, whose families were being sub-
jected to every form of official harassment, as well as economic
deprivation, who perceived every relationship with authority in terms
of conflict: whether at the workplace, in the compound, or in the
reserve. These were men who had no place to turn to. And hence the
all-embracing nature of the movement's preoccupations, its social
exclusiveness, and its urgency. The undertone of millenarianism, the
concept of the sudden dawning of a juster era, the moral implications
of the word 'poqo' (pure) - these are not surprising. For here was a
group of men who were simultaneously conscious both of the destruction
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that was being wreaked upon their old social world, and the hopeless-
ness of the terms being offered to them by the new order.
The strategy of a general uprising logically developed from this
vision. The twenty-one farmworkers of Stellenbosch put on trial in
June 1962 were found guilty on a number of charges which included mak-
ing preparations to attack a farm manager and his family, to burn the
farm buildings and then to march to the town firing buildings GEL the
way. For weapons the men sharpened old car springs into pangas. The
initiative for this strategy was probably a local one: most of the
national PAC leadership was in prison in 1961 and early 1962 and had
only fully regrouped in Maseru in August 1962. But by late 1962,
judging from the evidence of men involved in the Poqo attack at Paarl,
Poqo members were conscious of a plan for a nationally co-ordinated
insurrection, the directives for which would come from above. In
March 1963, Potlake Leballo, the PAC•s acting president, told a jour-
nalist that he was in touch with Western Cape and other regional lead-
ers. Despite this co-ordination of the Congress, there is a strong
case for asserting that the insurrectionary impetus came initially
from below and, as I have argued, can be directly related to the
social situation of Poqo's local leaders and their followers. Certain-
ly the violent impetus developed much earlier in PAC groups in the
Western Cape than elsewhere, the first attacks on policemen or their
informers beginning in Paarl in April 1961 and in Langa in April the
following year. Before the end of 1962 several groups had travelled
from the Langa migrant workers' quarters to the Transkei in efforts to
kill the Emigrant Tembu paramount chief, Kaiser Mantazima and a full
scale insurrection had taken place in the small Boland town of Paarl.
While the Western Cape Poqo cells had an internal dynamic and
momentum of their own, elsewhere the movement, more systematically
structured and more hierarchical than in the Western Cape, was
motivated less by local causes of social tension and more by the
strategic conception of those members of the PAC's national executive
who remained at liberty or who had been released from prison. Partly
for this reason it was less effective. Initially, with most of the
main leaders in prison there were few signs of PAC activity. With the
end of the emergency in August 1960 some important PAC men who had
been detained along with Congress Alliance people were released. In
particular, two Evatorv leaders, both on the National Executive, were
once again at liberty. One of them, Z B Molete, was delegated the
task of presiding over the underground organisation while the other
office-bearers were in prison, and he together with Joe Molefi, began
reviving branches.
The first indications of the re-establishment of an operating PAC
leadership was the circulation of a typewritten leaflet in September
in the Transkei with the heading 'A Call to PAC Leaders'. The leaflet
instructed PAC branches to divide into small units, cells. Branch
leaders were instructed to establish contact with the national and
regional executives in Johannesburg. Finally, the leaflet exhorted
PAC members to 'prepare for mass disciplined action1, for a 'final de-
cisive phase' with the object of 'total abolition of the pass laws'.
Obviously the leaflet's authors were still thinking of continuing the
pre-Sharpeville strategy of mass civil disobedience. There was no ex-
plicit indication in the leaflet of the possibility of violence. That
Molete and his colleagues did not at this stage share the insurrec-
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tionary disposition which was developing in the Cape is also signified
by their initial willingness to participate in the Orlando Consulta-
tive Conference of December 1961.
The Orlando Conference was prompted by a suggestion from the Inter-
denominational African Minister's Federation. Attending the meeting
were representatives from the ANC and the PAC, as well as leading Af-
rican members of the Liberal and Progressive Parties. At the insist-
ence of PAC spokesmen whites and coloured were excluded. After
several speeches, including an address by 2 B Molete on 'The Struggle
against the Pass Laws' the meeting resolved in favour of political
unity, non-violent pressures against apartheid, non-racial democracy,
and the calling of an 'All-in Conference representative of African
people1 to agitate for a national constitutional convention. A con-
tinuation committee under the chairmanship of Jordan Ngubane, a former
Youth Leaguer and a member of the Liberal Party, was elected.
The work of this continuation committee was soon over-shadowed by
conflict between the Liberals and the PAC on the one hand and the ANC
on the other. Ngubane claimed that the ANC with financial assistance
from the South African Communist Party worked to control the committee
and the All-in Conference. Without consulting other committee members
ANC people drafted jiublicity for the Conference to ensure its pro-
Congress character. Though Ngubane's accusations were probably
somewhat exaggerated it is likely that neither the PAC nor the ANC had
a particularly sincere concern for unity, not if this required making
concessions to the other side. By mid-March the PAC men and Ngubane
had resigned from the continuation committee and the All-in Conference
held in Pietermaritzburg on the 25th and 26th March, was, despite the
attendance of delegates from 140 organisations, a characteristically
Congress affair. Among the 1,400 participants were whites, coloureds
and Indians from the allied organisations. Traditional ANC rhetoric,
songs and slogans predominated. The highlight of the event was the
appearance of a recently unbanned Nelson Mandela, who made his first
public speech since 1952. In his address Mandela announced the first
phase of the campaign for a national convention which would take the
form of a three-day stay-at-home, the last day of which would coincide
with South Africa's proclamation of a republic on May 31st. Prepara-
tions for the strike would include an ultimatum to the Government to
call a convention.
At the time of the Orlando Conference it seems likely that the PAC
leaders at liberty did not have a very clear conception of the future
role of their organisation. Hence their somewhat unrealistic adher-
ence to the concept of a pass campaign which required forms of mobili-
sation unsuited to the operation of a clandestine movement. That they
were initially willing to participate in the Orlando Conference and
the continuation committee established in its wake was another indica-
tion of their confusion. Their withdrawal from the committee was
prompted apparently by a message from their imprisoned colleagues
brought to them by Matthew Nkoana, a national executive member who was
released early as a result of his fine being paid. Nkoana left
prison with 'instructions to crush moves to unity'. Immediately he
took the leadership out of the hands of Molete who, as he put it, was
•suffering from indecision' and rejected an initiative from Mandela to
participate in the organisation of the anti-republic protest:
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By late 1962 the headquarters of the movement had been transferred
from its rather precarious situation on the Witwatersrand to Maseru.
Potlake Leballo had arrived in August and armed with the authority
of a letter from Robert Sobukwe,_,established a 'Presidential Council'
o /
with himself as Acting Chairman. From this point preparations for a
popular insurrection began in earnest. But before examining these let
us first look at the nature and the scope of the PAC • s organisation
and support that had developed by the beginning of 1963.
There are two main sources of information on the size and location
of the PAC's organisation. These are firstly the often grandiose
claims made by the PAC leaders themselves and secondly the evidence
emerging from court cases. The former provide a rather exaggerated
impression of PAC strength while in the case of the latter the evi-
dence is incomplete. Despite the unsatisfactory quality of the evi-
dence it is possible to reconstruct from it a picture of the surpris-
ingly extensive network of PAC supporters.
PAC spokesmen in their claims about their organisation tended to
depict it in terms of a formal bureaucratic hierarchy with clear lines
of communication and control linking leaders with followers. In
November 1962 Potlake Leballo stated in an interview that the PAC had
sixteen regions, each with its own regional executive controlling a
number of branches, themselves divided into cells. T ^ § s e regions
embraced most of the country including the reserves. Patrick
Duncan, echoing Leballo in an article in the London Times, wrote of
150 ' nftiis' with it being • not uncommon' for a cell to have 1,000
members. A London newsletter carried a report of twelve 1,000-
strong cells in the Western Cape. These figures are likely to have
been inflated. In December 1959 before its banning the _PAC claimed a
total affiliation of 150 branches with 31,035 members. Even this
figure was a remarkably rapid expansion, bearing in mind the statis-
tics given one month previously for 101 branches and 24,664 members
distributed in the following fashion:
Transvaal - 47 branches - 13,324 members
Cape - 34 branches - 7,427 members
Natal - 15 branches - 3,612 members
Orange Free State - 5 branches - 301 members
Even this quite modest claim should be treated with scepticism:
according to the available evidence it is unlikely that membership in
the Western Cape exceeded _L,000, and this seemed to be where the
organisation was strongest. A claim by Robert Sobukwe that at the
time of_.the launching of the Pass Campaign PAC membership totalled
200,000 should not be taken seriously. If before the banning of
the organisation the PAC leadership presented inaccurate information
on the size of their following then their membership claims produced
after April 1960 were likely to have been no more reliable. Numerical
calculations of membership, though, are misleading indications of a
movement's capacity to mobilise large numbers of people. As in the
case of the 1960 Cape Town disturbances, relatively small numbers of
activists could function as catalysts for large scale unrest in a
volatile social context. More important are the questions of where
the organisation's members were situated, what sort of people they
were, and what kind of social environment they lived in.
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It is possible to document the existence of sixty-eight Poqo groups
as functioning in the April 1961 to April 1963 period (the two dates
representing the period between the PAC's banning and the time of the














The table at the end of this paper provides a summary of the evidence
upon which this data is based. Let us look at each regional concen-
tration in turn, beginning with the Transvaal.
The twenty-two Transvaal branches listed in the table represent
those on which information is available, either from first hand testi-
mony of former activists from the Transvaal organisation, or from the
records of the trials of those groups arrested by the police. Obvious-
ly the data is incomplete but because of the inadequacy of the leader-
ship's security precautions (see below) it is unlikely that many other
active groups existed. The major areas of PAC activity in this period
were first in Pretoria and then in the townships of the West Rand and
the Southern Transvaal. Reflecting a previous pattern these were areas
where the ANC had been relatively weak or inactive. The reasons for
the PAC's success in expanding its following in Pretoria is the topic
of another paper. Here our concern will be limited to forming
generalisations about the movement's social character and quality of
organisation. From the often sparse details provided by trial reports
and newspaper reports it seems that the Transvaal membership was gen-
erally youthful - the vast majority being in their teens or early
twenties - and if they were not still attending school were usually
employed in white-collar occupations. A few examples will have to
suffice. The eight men convicted of a PAC conspiracy in Daveyton in-
cluded a clerical worker, a laboratory assistant, a caterer, an
insurrance salesman and a schoolboy. Their ages ranged from seventeen
to twenty-three years. In Pretoria at least two groups consisted en-
tirely or mainly of school children. This was the case in Atteridge-
ville Township, Wbere a PAC cell led by two teachers existed at Hof-
meyr High School as well as at Kilnerton High School. There was
also a PAC cell (or branch?) at the Hebron African Teacher Training
College. Four men imprisoned for their activities as part of a PAC
conspiracy in Orlando, Soweto, included an unemployed clerk, an unem-
ployed school leaver and an employee oX the Municipal Pass Office. All
four were aged twenty or twenty-one. In Dobsonville, Roodepoort,
the twenty- nine year old editor of a religious newspaper was alleged
to be chairman of the local PAC branch. ° The chairman of the PAC's
Vaal region was David Sibeko, a young sports journalist. Even from
this very impressionistic picture there are obvious contrasts with the
movement developing in Langa described earlier in the chapter. Notice-
able by their absence from the list of identifiable Transvaal PAC mem-
bers are industrial or service workers and hostel dwellers. Here the
PAC was a movement of the young, the urbanised and the lower middle
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class and when educational details are available they suggest that
most members had had at least a few years of primary education and
that many had attended or were attending high school. The last point
is worth drawing attention to in a context in which African secondary
school enrolment in 1960 Represented less than 4 per cent of total
African school enrolment. The importance of schoolchildren as an
element in the P&C's following was often attested to by PAC leaders in
the early 1960s.
What evidence exists in the form of trials does not suggest an ex-
tensive PAC folowing in the 1960-1963 period in Natal. Efforts were
made to rebuild the organisation after its banning in the Durban area
in January 1961 and there were attempts to proselytise and recruit in
Pietermaritzburg, Howick and Chesterville. According to an interview
with Jordan Ngubane there was a PAC 'Task Force' at the Ohlanga Insti-
tute. In 1963 it received instructions to set fire to surrounding
cane fields as its contribution to the uprising. From the limited
information available to attempt even tentative generalisations would
not be justifiable. The same is also the case with the Orange Free
State, where only two branches can he identified as existing before
April I960, in Welkom and Bethlehem. The goldmining town of Welkom
continued to be a centre of PAC activity with at Xs&st three groups
being active after the banning of the organisation.
The Cape Province and the Transkei contained the main centres of
PAC activity. In the case of the Eastern Cape, evidence from the
1960-1963 period suggests that there were PAC branches in the two main
towns, East J^ondon and Port Elizabeth, in educational institutions
(Bensonvale, Lovedale College and Fort Hare University College 1,
and in several of the smaller t o w n s ^ well: De_Aar, Grahamstpwn,
Herschel, King William's Town, Molteno, Queenstown, and
Steynsburg. With the exception of King William's Town there is very
little information available on the 1963 Poqo groups in the smaller
towns, though after 1963 teachers played a key.role in Poqo conspira-
cies in those centres as well as in Middleburg and may have done so
earlier. Bearing in mind the concentration of important African
educational institutions in the Eastern Cape and the evidence of
political activity within them it is a reasonable hypothesis that some
of their graduates may have functioned as political catalysts in near-
by communities. In King William's Town, for instance, one of the
members q£ the local Poqo groups had recently been expelled from
Lovedale. In King William's Town thirty-three men were accused in
1963 of taking part in a Poqo insurrection. They were led by three
factory workers, local men who had grown up in the town's locations of
Zwelitsha and Tshatshe. With the exception of seven men most of the
accused were under twenty-five years of age and the oldest was only
fifty. A similar picture emerges from a trial concerning four men
from New Brighton, Port Elizabeth: they and the various other people
cited in the trial as Poqo activists were young, with at most a few
years of primary education, born in the locality, and if not at school
employed in unskilled capacities in various factories: a steelworks
and a car spring factory are specifically referred to in the record.
For the Eastern Province there is most evidence of PAC activity in
East London. One of the original nuclei of Africanists was in East
London and the local PAC branch had been active in the 1960 pass cam-
faign. One of the leading Pan-Africanists in the town, C J Fazzie,
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times be based on a particular institution (e.g. a school) or locality
within the township. In fact 'cells' often met together
 Qin large
meetings to be addressed by branch and more senior members. Within
each branch a 'task force' would be constituted from the younger men
in the organisation. The !_task force' members would do guard duty at
meetings, collect and manufacture weapons and explosives and in the
event of the uprising undertake the initial attacks. Each branch
would have a chairman and subordinate to him, a task force leader.
There would also. _b.e 'block stewards' with recruiting functions within
a certain area. A block corresponded to a cell. To communicate
with the Maseru leadership a clumsy code was used in which PAC branch-
es and their activity would be described with reference to forms of
popular entertainment. Branches were football teams, cinemas or dance-
halls and their offices and functions would be described accordingly.
The police were the 'forces of darkness' or 'skins'. The uprising
itself was called 'the twist session ' or 'the jive session1.
Notwithstanding its subjection to the supervision of the national
leadership and despite the efforts at secrecy it seems that the
organisation in the Transvaal was weak and demoralised. An insight
into the general state of the Witwatersrand is given in a letter dated
30th March, 1963 to the Maseru leadership from the Witwatersrand
'Football Club Manager' (Regional Chairman?) which was intercepted by
the police. The letter provides a telling impression of an
organisation preoccupied with personal feuds and internal suspicions,
these exacerbated by the arrests of branch organisers whom the police
had been able to trace through the Maseru's leadership's habit of
using the post office as its main vehicle of communication:
There has been gross negligence with most of our players
here instead of them leaving addresses with other people
when they were at HQ they only supplied pseudonyms with
their proper addresses leaving themselves open to such
dangers. They talk too much. They are emotional and not
very revolutionary in their behaviour.
We have withdrawn recognition of the Jabulani team. It
was formed by people from Zola who did not want to respect
their local leaders. Even most of the members of the team
are from Zola and were being told a pack of lies into losing
confidence and faith in their local management by people who
do not want to be led by others. ... These people in order
to destroy me dubbed me as an informer, exploiting the
sensitivities of players towards skins. It is quite clear
from reports I have been getting of the local intelligence
that even the men I appointed as my captains believe these
things. (The West Rand) ... are comparatively doing better
than the central complex, They shouldn' t at all be drawn
into this seething cauldron of hatred and personal clashes
which seems to be our disease.
Trial evidence suggests that the Witwatersrand officials accepted the
uprising plans only reluctantly and this is corroborated by the
circulars sent to the Transvaal by Leballo in February and March re-
primanding branches for the failure to prepare for the uprising.
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I must warn you very strongly that I shall not be intimida-
ted by your failure to obtain these arrangements. The Twist
MUST just go on whether you have these things or not. It is
not my own fault. You are to blame for that. I am going
ahead with my plans for the Twist or the Tournament. What I
do not like of you is not to tell me the truth. You talk
too much but you cannot li-VfiyMP to your claims!!! You don't
do hard work sufficiently.
The Eastern Cape more or less conformed to the Transvaal pattern of
organisation and there were also signs of low morale in some of the
branches. In New Brighton, Port Elizabeth, for instance, recalcitrant
recruits (including a Task Force captain) were regularly punished with
beatings for poor attendance at branch meetings. As in the case of
Johannesburg groups the New Brighton Task Force was reprimanded for
being behind-hand in their organisation. During 1961, incidental-
ly, New Brighton's PAC members were under the leadership of Pearce
Gqobose, the Eastern Cape regional chairman. Gqobose, an ex-serviceman
and social worker, had been involved in Africanist politics since
1946. He fled the country in 1962 to avoid arrest and joined Leballo's
'Presidential Council' in Maseru.
In the case of the Western Cape and the Transkeian groups there is
less evidence to suggest a formal defined hierarchy of leadership and
the structure of the organisation was influenced by pre-existing so-
cial networks provided by 'home-boy' groups, burial associations and
rurally oriented resistance movements formed in the wake of the imple-
mentation of the Bantu Authorities Act independently of the national-
ist political organisations. 7k§se included the Dyakobs, the
Jacobins, and the Makuluspan. Such bodies served to transmit
information and ideas between the Western Cape and the Transkei. It
seems likey that in the Transkei itself the Poqo groups were started
by migrant workers from Cape Town. The more autonomous character
of the movement in these areas tended to protect it from police
interference: a great deal of police information resulted from the
indiscretions of the Maseru leadership and its communication system. A
final distinguishing feature pi" these Poqo groups was their resort to
magical protective measures. This last point testifies to the
major contrast that can be drawn between the Transvaal/Eastern Cape
groups and the Western Cape/Transkei groups. In the case of the
former the movement was constructed around the organisational concep-
tions and strategic ideas of a small and socially removed group of
leaders. At base level the Poqo groups had very little vitality of
their own: their members' main activity was to attend meetings at
which they were alternately harangued or exhorted to make themselves
ready for the great day of the uprising. Little was said at such
meetings which was directly relevant to their specific circumstances.
The movement's constituency was predominantly youthful, often with a
limited range of social experience. In the case of the latter the
movement developed organisationally from the bottom up, adapting
itself to the social institutions it found around it, generating its
own ideas and fuelled to a much greater extent by locally relevant
anxieties and preoccupations, particularly those emanating from the
countryside.
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To return to our narrative, by the last three months of 1962 prepa-
rations for a national insurrection had begun in earnest. Poqo task
force members were instructed by their leaders to gather materials and
manufacture weapons and task force leaders and branch chairmen were
urged to step up recruitment. A thousand recruits were needed for
each 'hall' {cell or block). The weapons were very crude. Bombs
were improvised from petrol-filled bottles and tennis balls filled
with ball-bearings, permanganate of potash, glycerin and match heads.
Swords were fashioned from filed-down pieces of scrap metal.
Recruitment methods were no more sophisticated. A group in Port
Elizabeth were told:
We must organise right through the towns and in the buses.
When you sit in a bus, the man next to you, you must tell
him about this organisation.
Perhaps to compensate for the rudimentary quality of these prepara-
tions many task force members were encouraged to believe that on the
great day help would come from outside: weapons had been promised by
Russia, one of the New Brighton task force leaders claimed, though
more commonly it was asserted that the assistance would be African:
The African States would assist us in the Revolution by
coming in aeroplanes and various war vehicles.
The independent states are with us - they are going to
help us. Ben Bella has promised assistance. They will come
with aeroplanes.
We would be supplied with arms and ammunition from the
African States from the North and we would also be assisted
by their soldiers.
The promise of external aid was a recurrent theme in Leballo's talks
to the groups of branch leaders who were summoned to Maseru in Feb-
ruary and March of 1963. In November 1962 Leballo had left Basuto-
land for a few weeks to visit the United Nations offices, stopping off
on his return home in Ghana and it is possible that some of the
urgency of his subsequent communications to his followers was inspired
by assurances of support from Ghanaian and other African government
spokesmen.
Task force members all seem to have had a broadly similar concep-
tion of how the uprising would begin. In each centre different groups
would be assigned to attacks on police stations, post offices, power
installations and other government buildings. Groups should then turn
their attention to the white civilian population which they were to
kill indiscriminately. The killing should go on for four hours and
should ±hen cease, when the insurgents should await further instruc-
tions. Most of the features of this plan were attributable to the
instructions contained in Leballo's talks to branch leaders and they
formed the basic elements in an insurrectionary concept shared by PAC
conspiracies throughout the country. Exactly when this uprising
was to take place was not revealed to rank and file. It would be in
1963 for that was the original date set by Sobukwe for the attainment
of South African 'independence1, but as for the exact date this would
be appointed by the leadership in the near future. In the Eastern Cape
The Poqo Insurrection . 15
some branches were told that the date of the uprising would coincide
with Sobukwe's release f^Qm prison so that he would once again be able
to direct the struggle. This reflected a more generalised attribu-
tion to Sobukwe of prophet-like qualities of leadership. Only in
April were task force members given a definite date and this merely a
day or two before the chosen time. Branches and regional leaders
were sent letters at the end of March giving them instructions for an
uprising in early April. The addressed letters were intercepted by the
police when they arrested the courier sent from Maseru to post the
letters in Bloemfontein.
By the end of March the police had a fairly accurate idea of the
nature and scope of these arrangements. In November Poqo insurgents
acting on their own initiative had staged an attack on the small
Western Province town of Paarl and the following month several groups
travelled from Cape Town to the Transkei to assassinate Matanzima and
were intercepted by the police. In March several branch leaders
returning to the Cape and the Transvaal from Maseru were arrested and
detained. On March 24th Leballo gave a press conference in which he
announced the PAC' s intention to mount a general uprising, claiming
that over 100,000 armed followers were waiting for his signal.
Final instructions had to be given to twenty-three branch chairmen who
were now on their way back to South Africa. In the last week of March
South African police, aided by the list of addresses they were able to
assemble from Leballo's correspondence, began to detain key local
activists in the Transvaal. On April 1st the colonial authorities in
Basutoland arrested those PAC leaders they could find in Maseru and
closed down the PAC's office confiscating a quantity of documentation
including membership lists allegedly containing 100,000 names and
addresses. Leballo prudently went into hiding. According to affi-
davits the Basutoland police raid was carried out in the presence of
South African security policy and the colonial government was later
accused of supplying the South Africans with information. In the
first week of April hundreds of arrests took place throughout South
Africa. In May the Minisjter of Justice announced that 3,246 Poqo sus-
pects had been arrested. Despite the arrests Poqo groups mounted
attacks in several centres in the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal.
In King William's Town at 2.30 on the morning of the 9th a group of
fifteen men entered the courtyard of the office building which con-
tained the police station and Commissioner's office. Their first
objective was to free Poqo suspects held prisoner before launching a
general insurrection. They were part of a group of sixty men armed
with incendiary bombs, knives and clubs. These men threw their bombs
through the charge office windows and advanced on the cell doors
before being driven back by police gunfire. They thereupon dispersed
and subsequently many were arrested and tried en masse. One of the
accused, incidentally was called Bomwana Biko.^-^
In East London the police successfully anticipated local PAC prepa-
rations. On the same night as the King William's Town attack two to
three hundred men walking in groups of four to eight congregated in
the open veld outside the old section of Duncan Village. Many carried
homemade swords and axes in haversacks and bags. From the moment the
men began assembling, at 6.30 on the evening of the 8th, they were be-
ing watched by police several of whom had arrived at the rendezvous
before them. Apparently an informer had betrayed the Poqo men. At
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about 10 o'clock when the last men had arrived the police watchers
sent for reinforcements but the advent of these was noticed by a task
force patrol which fired on the police. After an exchange of shots
the meeting broke up, eleven men being arrested immediately and over a
hundred later. Subsequent trials confirmed that the men were about to
launch an uprising in East- London according to a pre-formulated plan.
The police reinforcements interrupted them while they were waiting for
petrol. Children evidently played an important role in the prepara-
tions, young teenage boys being given files, hacksaws and motor
springs and told to fashion these into swords (the task of producing
one blade took two days). Some of the youths were recruited by women.
In both this trial and the King William's Town trial there was
evidence that many of the young auxiliaries were reluctant conscripts
rather than highly motivated volunteers.
The following night three small groups of young men travelled from
Orlando to Johannesburg. Two men from one of the groups broke into a
clothing store while others stood guard and using petrol bombs set
alight counters in the old section of the building. A similar attack
was intended on a sportswear shop but the insurgents were interrupted
by a police patrol after breaking a window. A third group marched to
the premises of Shell (SA) Pty which accommodated some oil storage
facilities. Finding the main gates locked and on encountering a night
watchman the members of the task force decided to go home. These
events were part of a larger conspiracy for which there is no evidence
of any comparably serious attempts to implement objectives which
included the destruction of Orlando police and power stations. The
targets in the Johannesburg central business districts were well
chosen. They were old or by their nature highly inflammable and they
were situated in an architecturally congested part of town where the
likelihood of a well established fire spreading was high. These arson
attempts in Johannesburg were the climax of several days of hurried
preparation including several meetings being held in the week before
the attack at which fresh recruits were inducted (some of whom par-
ticipated in the Johannesburg task force) and an all day bomb making
session on the 8th. Task forces were informed of their targets only
immediately before setting out to attack them. There is evidence to
suggest several other Poqo conspiracies in Soweto, and it should be
remembered that many of the Rand PAC groups had already been arrested.
The last minute character of the preparations, however, and the fact
that the events took place one day later than in the Eastern Cape, and
the manner in which the attacks were implemented, helps to strengthen
the impression that many of the RancLinsurrectionists were less than
totally committed to the conspiracy.
This view is corroborated by details from the trial of David Sibe-
ko, the Chairman of the Southern Transvaal region. Though the evidence
of state witnesses was discounted in court and Sibeko was acquitted,
in exile he subsequently confirmed in broad outline the truth of the
prosecution's case. One witness claimed that he was nominated at a
meeting in the Vereeniging area to travel to Maseru. In Maseru he was
given instructions concerning the uprising. On returning to Vereenig-
ing he was told that the date of the uprising was arranged for April
7th. On April 1st he was told to collect some bombs from a woman in
Pretoria. These were going to be used in an attack on Vanderbijlpark
police station and the Escom power installation. He allegedly failed
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to find the woman and returned empty handed. The bombs were collected
on the 7th by Gabriel Sandamela, one of the members of the regional
executive. The witness was informed by Sibeko on the 7th that the up-
rising had been postponed for a day because of the police being aware
of the conspiracy. However, when he next saw Sibeko and Sandamela
they were busy preparing to travel to Dar es Salaam via Bechuanaland.
There was no uprising in Vereeniging.
Elsewhere the story was much the same: large numbers of arrests
frustrated some local conspiracies and demoralised others. The Maseru
leadership was either in hiding or in prison. Robert Sobukwe, probably
ignorant of the uprising plan, on completing his prison sentence was
detained on Robben Island for a further six years. In June the
Minister of Justice claimed that the Poqo movement had been destroyed.
By June the following year 1,162 Poqo members had been convicted under
the Sabotage Act.
Notwithstanding the Minister's claim, Poqo groups continued to be
active for some years to come, the last recorded incidence of a Poqo
conspiracy being in Welkom in December 1968. There was no comparably
ambitious effort by a central leadership to organise a national insur-
rection: Poqo activity after April 1963 was very localised in charac-
ter. Until 1965 there was some effort by Maseru-based leaders to co-
ordinate the activities of different PAC/Poqo branches. Despite a
shift which developed in the course of 1964 in the external leaders'
conception of strategy away from insurrectionism in favour of protrac-
ted guerilla warfare, surviving activists within the country continued
to plot apocalyptic local uprisings. On the Witwatersrand, for exam-
ple, a regional committee was formed towards the end of April 1963. It
was led by two professional golfers and a boxing manager. It succeeded
in re-establishing links with the Maseru group and conceived a plan to
mount an uprising on December 16th, the Day of the Covenant. Whites
attending nationalist festivities in Pretoria were to be attacked by
bees. Unusually, for a Rand conspiracy, the participants intended to
deploy witchcraft, though they also tried to obtain hand grenades from
a man who worked at the Drill Hall in Johannesburg. The conspirators
were encouraged by Edwin Makoti and Leballo (who reappeared in Maseru
in September 1963) for the rising would coincide with the United
Nations session at which they hoped to mobilise international support.
Makoti visited Johannesburg in October to make arrangements for the
the passage out of the country of recruits for guerrilla training but
was informed by the committee that they had failed to find people
willing to leave the country. Lack of transport facilities and a fail-
ing confidence in the powers of witchcraft persuaded the conspirators
to abandon their plans. Meanwhile in May 1963 a group in Lady Frere
(Glen Grey district) plotted attacks on the magistrate's home and the
police station followed by more generalised arson and killing.
Elsewhere remaining PAC groups in Cape Town, Durban and East London
contented themselves with recruiting and sending men abroad for
military instruction.
The next phase of internal activity followed the conception of a
plan in July 1964 by the Presidential Council for a Lesotho-based
guerilla operation. The plan seemed to have two separate sources of
inspiration. While, in conformity with previous PAC strategic think-
ing it argued that:
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Insurrection or even minor skirmishes of an effective
nature, well planned, are sufficient to set in motion a full
scale revolution any time in South Africa.
it went on to state:
Our struggle is bound to be a protracted one. We must not
reckon in terms of lightning warfare and an immediate
victory. Apart from the unpredictable nature of warfare
itself, the enemy is fully aware of our intentions and has
been preparing himself accordingly for a number of years.
Ours is a guerilla form of warfare against regular army
forces. Our indispensable condition in these circumstances
is to wear down the enemy systematically, hitting him hard-
est where he is weakest and then retreating where he is
strongest.
The document comprised mainly of detailed plans for launching a gue-
rilla insurgency: it discussed escape routes, training programmes,
the use of explosives, logistics, lines of communication, and the role
of external diplomatic representatives of the movement. Initial opera-
tions would have two dimensions. Careful clandestine activity would
complete the groundwork for a long-term rural guerilla insurgency. An
operational base was to be established in Qacha's Nek, a village on
the Lesotho border with the Transkei. A boat purchased in London
would offload arms on to the Transkeian coast. PAC trainees would
form a nucleus of a locally recruited insurgent force. While these
preparations were in progress, support for the movement would be
generated by a campaign of terrorism which would include assassina-
tions of important white politicians, kidnapping of school children,
the destruction of symbolically important buildings, as well as the
seizure of gold bullion, money, arms and ammunition.
It is difficult to ascertain how seriously the Maseru group regard-
ed this plan. Later it was suggested that the main purpose of the
document outlining it was to persuade the Organisation of African
Unity's African Liberation Committee to allocate funds to the PAC. The
equivalent of R100.000 was handed over by the ALC to Potlake Leballo
in late 1964 and subsequently Leballo was charged with fraud when he
could not account for a large proportion of this sum's expenditure.
Despite this possible motive it seems that various efforts were made
to implement parts of the plan. A Transkeian based Poqo cell active
in the Mqanduli district was instructed to locate hiding places for
arms and insurgents. In September 1964 activists from East London
were taken to various houses in the Quthing area and shown how to make
firearms. Two members of the Presidential Council, Letlaka and
Mfaxa, were later found in a Maseru trial to have administered a
guerilla training camp near Quthing. Lectures, physical training and
weapons construction were part of the curriculum. Cape Town based
Poqo groups were delegated the tasks of reconnoitering the Hex River
railway tunnel with a view to derailing the 'Blue Train' Johannesburg
to Cape Town express and searching for guerilla hiding places in
Namaqualand and the mountainous area near Paarl. It seems that
since 1963 a new regional organisation had been established in Cape
Town under much closer control of the Maseru leadership than the pre-
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vious Poqo network. In the Eastern Cape rural centre of Molteno a
PAC branch was revived in April 1964 by a local school teacher, Harry
Mathebe, after he had attended a meeting with a member of the Presi-
dential Council in Herschel. In the course of 1964 Mathebe succeeded
in recruiting thirty. The branch held its first meeting in December
1964 at which plans for a local uprising were discussed. Before these
were to be implemented it was resolved that a trip should be made to
Johannesburg to buy guns. Conspirators were allegedly told that after
the uprising they would be able to 'stay in the white houses'. Most
of the new branch's members were arrested in February. A group with
similar intentions was discovered in Steynsbur£. Once again it was
led by a school teacher. His fifty-odd followers included a shop
assistant and a shoemaker but mainly comprised illiterate unskilled
labourers.
On 29th April, 1965 the Maseru based members of the Presidential
Council were taken into custody by the Basutoland authorities and
shortly afterwards put on trial (Potlake Leballo was not amongst
these, he had left Maseru in August the previous year and was not in
Dar es Salaam). The Maseru group was acquitted on appeal (it was
found its members had committed no crimes in Basutoland). Some of
them subsequently joined the other PAC principals in Dar es Salaam,
others fell victim to the leadership feuds which plagued the movement
and were expelled by Leballo, and one, John Pokela, acting national
secretary, was captured (allegedly kidnapped in Buthe Buthe, gasuto)
in August 1966 by the South African authorities and convicted.
From 1965 remaining PAC groups inside the country functioned in-
dependently : there were no longer any lines of communication with any
leadership centre outside the country. Their activity conformed to
the established, insurrectionary nattern: groups,, in Laingsburo,
Graaff Reinet, Victoria West, Middleburg, Steynsburg in
the Cape and Umzinto and Esperenza in Natal were discovered in
the course of their preparations for local uprisings. In addition in-
surrectionary PAC cells were formed among convicts by previous itobben
Island inmates of Gamkaspoort, Baviaanspoort, Bellville and
Leeukop prisons. With the exception of the convicts about whom no
sociological detail is available from the trial evidence, most of the
other conspiracies apart from their common strategic intention had a
strikingly similar social composition: leaders were usually teachers
or clergymen and their following normally consisted of unskilled
labourers. A few examples must suffice. In 1964 Jonathan Hermanus
arrived in Graaff Reinet location as Methodist Minister. Initially he
was active in efforts to improve the prevalently poor local conditions
in the location. To this end he formed a Wesleyan Guild for church
youth. In early 1966 increasingly disenchanted with social work he
began to recruit people for a Poqo branch. He was transferred in 1967
and the movement died out. As well as Hermanus, church elders and
a school teacher were later tried for leading roles in a violent con-
spiracy. In Victoria West a minister, a school principal and vari-
ous service workers - garage attendants, milkmen, shop assistants,
messengers and hospital labourers - were involved in plans to obtain
weapons to attack police stations, cut telephone wires and poison
water supplies. According to one state witness, it was said at one of
the meetings:
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When the whites come to Victoria West, they soon had a house
and a new car. They enjoyed better wages and privileges and
that was why whites had to be killed. In this way the
fatherland could be regained for the non-whites.
Three of the conspiraci-es were composed of farmworkers, those in Natal
and at Laingsburg. The Natal conspiracies were located on sugar
estates and were led by a PAC activist from Durban. The Laingsburg
movement was led by a lay-preacher, R Ndoylo. He appeared at a Satur-
day bible meeting attended by the workers from one farm and chose as
his text a passage from Lamentations: 'Our skin was black like an
oven because of the terrible famine'. He went on to 'explain to us
that it was difficult to get food and water and that our land was
being taken away from us. At Vleiland (the farm) we got very little
money. We were paid 70 cents a week and that was very little ... He
said according to Poqo they should be paid 70 cents a day1 . Ndoylo
later told his followers that after the arrival of weapons from the
Congo they would participate in an 'uprising which would take place
simultaneously all over the country on an appointed day. Ndoylo would
tell the people at Vleiland when that day was'.
In Welkom a departure from this pattern occurred in 1968 when J
Ramoshaba, a former student of Fort Hare, a social worker employed on
the goldfields, and a member of the Thabang Township Urban Bantu Coun-
cil, presided over a revival of the local PAC branch. He and his
confederates attempted to raise funds to send people abroad for mili-
tary training. With their arrest PAC activity inside South Africa was
to cease until the mid 1970s.
In an analysis of the Poqo movement some useful starting points can
be drawn from the literature on general theories of collective action.
Existing treatments of South African insurgent movements have on the
whole been influenced by the social theory emerging from the United
States in the 1960s. Edward Feit and Fatima Meer both seem to share
the premise that 'order is the normal state of things and that dis-
order is very difficult to sustain'. As Meer puts it: 'Revolution,
though dependent on the populace, is not a popular cause. The security
of a familiar system, even if limiting, is invariably preferable to
the risks of change'. In such a context collective violence is
viewed as pathological and hence irrational:
The picture of a mass ready for the final plunge to liberate
itself is deceptive. It is observed by abstracting the
motifs of rebellion scattered through a tapestry, which
otherwise speaks of reasonable peace and quite. While spon-
taneous uprisings are clear indications of deep sores, they
are certainly no indication of people's intelligent, ration-
al and conscious awareness of these sores. They are rather
symptoms of mass psychosis, and like the psychotic who is
unable to see the root of his passion beyond the immediate
trifle which provoked it, so too, is the vision of the mass
shallow and blurred.
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When these latter start infringing on local rights and resources a
second generation of popular violence manifests itself. This the
Tillys term reactive violence, essentially acts of resistance to
attempts from the centre to control the periphery. Tax rebellions,
food riots, Luddism, and the evasion of enclosed land are examples of
reactive violence. With the triumph of the state and the national
market a third set of struggles ensues as groups make claims for
rights and resources not previously enjoyed. Here collective action is
geared to attempts 'to control rather than resist different segments
of the national structure*. The insurrectionary strike would be an
example of what the Tillys call 'proactive1 collective violence.
Ostensibly social breakdown analysis would seem easier to apply to
the Poqo disturbances. The movement was drawn from groups which were
peripheral rather than central to the development of a modern indus-
trial economy, or from people who had not been totally socially encap-
sulated by that process. The roles of unskilled migrant labourers,
farmworkers (in an increasingly capital intensive agriculture), serv-
ice workers in small rural towns, and even school children can be con-
ceptualised thus. The conjunction in the movement's constituency
between groups threatened with or actually undergoing a process of
marginalisation and such middle class elements as teachers, clerics
and office workers might be explained with reference to both the
morally disorienting effects of rapid social change for the former and
a crisis of rising expectations for the latter. The inclusion of
magic and witchcraft in Poqo/PAC tactics, the impracticality of its
insurrectionary concept, the millenarian undertones of the movement -
its belief in an apocalyptic 'great day', its investiture of Sobukwe
with biblical attributes of leadership, its strategic dependence on
external intervention - all these features could be employed to
explain the movement's emergence and following in terms of the trans-
ient social dislocations introduced as a by-product of modernisation.
In such a scheme the 'irrationality' of the movement would reflect the
hysteria of victims of social progress.
There are problems, though, with such an analysis. Examining the
movement in its different contexts its appeal at times is far more
general than such an argument might suggest. In Lady Frere, for
example, in 1963, a Poqo conspiracy involved a major proportion of the
adult African men in the location. The superimposition of Poqo on
earlier resistance organisations in the migrant society of the Western
Cape and the peasant communities of the Transkei and its drawing upon
well established networks and local ideology again does not suggest a
movement based upon morally disoriented people in a situation of
anomie. The violent Poqo conspiracies took place in a context of much
wider incidence of collective violence than is obvious from the aca-
demic treatments of South African insurgencies cited above. To take
one example: in the time when Poqo cells were being established among
school children (and in some cases their teachers) African rural
schools were periodically shaken by waves of pupil violence. In 1963,
for instance, in three months there were reports of rioting, arson,
strikes and mass walkouts or suspensions at five leading educational
institutions in the Easterr^£ape and the Transkei: Lovedale^ the
Faku Institute, Flagstaff- Bethal College, Butterworth, Sigcau
High School, Flagstaff and Healdtown. Once again, this does
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not suggest, at least in its local context, that Poqo's violence was
that of the socially deviant.
A more helpful approach may be found in the second group of writers
referred to above and in particular from the conceptions derived from
the Tillys' work. Poqo's social complexity does not permit easy causal
generalisations; its regional variation in both constituency and
organisation embraced very different political responses which were
different at least partly because they were responses to different
things. The political preoccupations of migrant workers in Cape Town
were to an extent shaped by events in the Transkei; despite their
involvement in the urban economy they still had residual links with
rural culture. In the Transkei itself peasants {who themselves often
had experience of migrant labour) were engaged in defending their
rights over land and their notions of land husbandry against intensi-
fying efforts by the state to control and modify these. In such a con-
text Poqo drew its strength largely from what the Tillys would call
reactive and competitive movements though its initial inspiration was
proactive as would be the case with any nationalist organisation.
Elsewhere I have attempted to reconstruct the movement's following in
the local contexts of the Transkei and Paarl. Here the actions of its
participants were influenced by a communal matrix of struggle and
within the limits of the knowledge available to them their behaviour
was rational enough: it can be explained without recourse to notions
of mass psychosis.
But this is not the whole story. The involvement of Transvaal
groups in the Poqo conspiracy did not stem from reactive concerns nor
did it seem to represent such a popular constituency: here the move-
ment's following was much more narrowly socially defined. The same
too could be said for the Eastern Cape groups: unlike the Transvaal
organisation they included industrial workers but these were commonly
very youthful. At this point the existence of another violent insur-
gent movement needs to be born in mind, Umkhonto we Sizwe, which was
most active in the two main Eastern Province towns, in Durban and in
Johannesburg and Pretoria. Umkhonto was a much smaller organisation
than Poqo, technologically more sophisticated in its methods, tact-
ically more effective, and its strategy reflected an intellectually
more complex analysis of South African society. While Poqo in its
areas of strength drew on locally evolved resistance movements Umkhon-
to benefited from the modern organisational framework created by a
much more powerful nationalist organisation than the PAC as well an
allied trade union movement. Though Umkhonto was in its conception
and performance an insurgent elite nevertheless it was itself the
product of a decade of mass-based proactive struggles. In two centres,
Port Elizabeth and East London, there is evidence of a substantial
support base for the Umkhonto insurgents. The local leaders here were
men who had been at the forefront of communal political assertions
since the 1940s. In this context the nature of Poqo's constituency
in such centres as Port Elizabeth, East London or even Pretoria becom-
es more understandable: it was composed of people who though affected
by a communal history of revolt belonged to groups which were not eas-
ily incorporated into the increasingly proletarian following of the
ANC, or who were too young to have been involved in the pre-1960
struggles. In the case of young school children a study made in 1963
may be of some relevance. From samples of future autobiographies
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written by African high school students in 1950 and 1960 it is poss-
ible to trace a declining interest in individual economic and social
aspirations and a sharp increase in commitment to political activi-
ty. . A survey conducted among professional people, ministers,
teachers, clerks and students and school children in the Transvaal
showed the PAC to be the most popular group among the sample and S U R ^
port for the PAC tended to correlate with acceptance of violence.
Within the sample endorsement of violence or some type of force re-
flected the view of a large minority - forty-three per cent. As in
the case of the Transkei and the Western Cape, the Poqo conspiracies
in the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape should not be examined in isola-
tion, for apart from the activities of other insurgent movements,
there is evidence of quite widespread sentiments which while not pro-
viding proof of a popular willingness to participate in violent revolt
does indicate that violent actions were widely seen as legitimate.
This will become clearer in local case studies. The comparative weak-
ness of the Transvaal/Eastern Cape impulse to violence in contrast to
the behaviour of the Western Cape/Transkeian groups can be attributed
to the predominant organisational features of each. In conformity
with the Tillys' thesis, the former proactive movement depended on the
mobilising capacity of a modern political association whilst the
latter partly reactive movement drew to a much greater extent on com-
munal bases for political action. Earlier in this chapter the con-
trast was described as one between an organisational structure imposed
from above and a movement which had developed organically from the
bottom up. Given the state imposed barriers confronting black efforts
to create large scale political associations it is not surprising that
the 'organic' movement provided the strongest response.
A final comment on the role of teachers in Poqo will help to under-
score the argument concerning the movement's communal legitimacy. As
we have seen teachers figured prominently in Eastern Cape Poqo con-
spiracies as well as in the Transkei. In this region teachers had been
uncharacteristically active in political organisations: an example of
this can be found in the political history of the Cape African Teach-
er ' s Association as a constituent of the All African Convention.
With its radical isation in the late 1940s CATA could provide an
organisation based on the dense network of mission schools long estab-
lished in the region. Teachers themselves had their security and
status threatened by the Bantu Authorities and school boards systems
and may also, suggests Colin Bundy, have been radicalised by the pupil
disturbances in the region which accommodated some of the largest Af-
rican schools and colleges in the country. Teachers were especial-
ly influential in the countryside and small towns where illiteracy
rates were high and other middle class elements often absent. Bearing
in mind their poor pay and recent interference by the state in their
profession it is not surprising to find radical rural opposition move-
ments gravitating around them as leaders. In the Eastern Cape small
town and rural communities were unusually subject to the influence of
the political organisations. As well as the narodnik dimension of the
AAC's activity, Fort Hare and other colleges served as local dissemi-
nators of political ideas. Interviewed in the late 1960s Tennyson
Makiwane remembered:
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Then I got to Fort Hare where the Youth League was very well
established. And there was the period when the Defiance
Campaign was being launched and this attracted tremendous
interest among the youth and we used to go to the neighbour-
ing villages and organise people to the Defiance ... as far
as King William's Town, Adelaide, Beaufort and Port Eliza-
beth. We used to go to them at night and sometimes over
weekends to address meetings of villages. ... In our area
we touched most of the villages.
Also relevant in this context were the activities of the Herschel
branch of the Congress Youth League in 1949. This branch ran an
education class for twenty-five herdboys in Ndunga. It also had plans
for adults and children's literacy classes in the Bluegums area and ad-
ministered a cooperative saving society which had accumulated £60.
The presence of PAC branches at a significant number of Eastern Cape
educational institutions a decade later may help to explain the part
played by teachers in small town Eastern Cape Poqo groups.
The historiographical neglect of the PAC can be related to the iss-
ues discussed above. The influence of social breakdown theory directly
or indirectly has affected much of the analysis of Black South African
politics. Movements of what might be diagnosed as collective madness
are not considered worthy of sustained analysis by writers concerned
with what they see as the mainstream of Black political response. Even
Gail Gerhart, a scholar who handles theoretical issues with extreme
caution, explains Poqo's behaviour with reference to a Fanonist-need
for catharsis, rather than in terms of the specific situation of
socially coherent groups. For a writer whose preoccupation is with the
development of anatavistic black political tradition Gerhart shows a
surprising lack of curiosity in one of the few popular expressions of
her chosen theme. The lack of interest of Gerhart and other
authorities in Poqo is mainly attributable, though, to their preference
for writing about organisations rather than social movements,
particularly those organisations which . produce an abundance of
documentation. Much of the historical writing about African politics
is therefore the history of leaders, not followers. Meticulous and
scholarly as some of this work is it discusses at best superficially
the greater social conflicts which underlie the biographical and
organisational developments which form the main focus of study. In
this survey it is hoped that the historical significance of the Poqo
movement is made clear. It was a response to crisis of a varied but
distinctive set of social groups. Its strategy and ideology only
becomes comprehensible when these groups and the situation with which
they have to contend are clearly identified.
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